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In this paper we investigate emission trading within the EU and, more specifically, some
proposals to impose ceilings on emission trading. We compare different proposals put
forward by the EU negotiators at the international level in the framework of the Kyoto
Protocol and apply them to intra-EU greenhouse gasses emission trading. It turns out that
these proposals imply important differences in the distribution of emission trading gains
among the EU member states. A public choice approach is used to investigate which EU
countries would benefit from imposing import and/or export ceilings. We try to interpret
the ceiling proposals as the outcome of a voting game among the EU member states on
uniform ceiling rates. The simulations suggest that the most likely ceiling proposals match
closely the interests of the big EU member states France, the UK and in particular
Germany. The simulation model we are using consists of a set of marginal cost of carbon
emission abatement functions calibrated to PRIMES simulation results reported by Capros
and Mantzos (1999).
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The European Commission’s Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Within the
European Union (EC (2000)), advocates the use of tradable emission permits within the EU
as a way of increasing cost efficiency of European climate policy. Greenhouse gas (GHG)
emission trading is one of the “flexible mechanisms” provided for in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol on the reduction of GHGs. The Kyoto Protocol
1 stipulates that this international
emission trading mechanism can only come into action after the start of the “first
commitment period”, hence from 2008 onwards. The ECs Green Paper calls however for
installing a European GHG emission market already earlier, from 2005 onwards. This
exclusively EU emission market would have several advantages. First, it would give EU
companies some time to get used to the permit trading system. Since Europe has little
experience compared to the USA with emission permits, it is often feared that European
companies would not be ready for competing on an international GHG emission market in
2008. Secondly, it would give the EU an opportunity to show to the secretariat of the
Kyoto Protocol some “demonstrable progress” towards the achievement of the 8% emission
abatement target for the European Bubble. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the ECs
Green Paper shows that this EU GHG emission market could lead to substantial cost
savings compared to uncoordinated national climate change policies. According to
simulations with the PRIMES model
2, total cost savings from adopting emission trading
within the EU might amount to more than 9 billion € annually. For the broader international
GHG emission market, similar important cost savings have been reported in several studies,
see Weyant and Hill (1999) for a recent survey.
It should be recognised however that the EU position towards emission trading is somewhat
ambiguous. In the framework if the international negotiations in the aftermath of Kyoto, the
EU has pleaded strongly for the so-called “supplementarity” clause in the Kyoto Protocol.
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol contains a reference to supplementarity in the sense that
emission trading should be supplemental to domestic actions. The idea is that it would be
unfair that some rich countries would simply buy all of their committed GHG emission
reduction abroad without implementing a substantial domestic climate policy. Countries als
                                               
1 For the text of the Kyoto Protocol, see http://www.unfccc.org
2 PRIMES is a EU-wide energy system optimization model developped by the National Technical University
of Athens NTUA, see Capros and Mantzos (1999,2000) or
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/enveco/studies2.htm#5.4
fear adverse impacts on competitiveness if other Parties would buy their way out.
Subsequently, the EU has proposed some quantitative ceilings on emission trading
3.
But, behind this rhetoric of “supplementarity” a much stronger argument of self interest is
hidden. It was convincingly shown by Ellerman and Wing (2000) that ceilings on permit
imports are a way of exercising monopsony power. Indeed, by restricting demand for
permits on the international market, the permits become less scarce and their price will fall.
Simulations for Kyoto GHG emission trading reported by, among others, Ellerman and
Wing (2000) and Criqui et al. (1999), suggest that the EU and USA would benefit strongly
from the imposition of moderate import ceilings. Hence, behind the debate on
supplementarity, one might suspect a struggle for the gains of emission trading.
In this paper we want to extend this logic to the European pre-Kyoto GHG emission
market. As far as we know, there are no proposals yet for adopting restrictions on emission
imports and exports but we will argue that chances are high that the supplementarity debate
will affect the EU market as well since for some countries, the stakes are high. After
demonstrating theoretically the point that ceilings on permit import or exports can be
interpreted as a way to exercise monopsony or monopoly power, we turn to some
simulations of the EU GHG emission market in isolation.
We use a simple simulation model, the core of which consists of a set of marginal GHG
emission abatement cost curves (MAC), one for each EU member country. This model was
developed in Eyckmans and Cornillie (2000) and builds upon Cornillie (2000). The MAC
curves were estimated using simulations results of the European PRIMES energy model by
Capros and Mantzos (1999,2000). We borrowed the MAC methodology from Ellerman and
Decaux (1998).
We will make use of two approaches to investigate ceilings in the EU market. First, we
compute the constrained emission market equilibria for the different ceiling proposals that
the EU negotiators have put forward in the international climate negotiations. Using a
simple measure of bargaining power, we compute which EU countries would gain or lose
from adopting a particular proposal in the EU permit market. Secondly, we adopt a public
choice approach and try to predict the outcome of a European voting game on uniform
import/export ceilings. We plot cost ratios of the constrained market outcomes for all EU
                                               
3 The different proposals can be found in Ellerman and Wing (2000) or in the official documents of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change: http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/1999/sb/08.pdf5
member states and try to infer what would be their most preferred ceiling rate. Using some
simple or qualified majority rule we then identify a likely ceiling rate and compare it to the
different proposals we computed earlier.
This paper’s focus is mainly positive or descriptive, i.e. we try to reveal the incentives
behind the ceilings arguments. From a normative point of view however, we feel that
emission trading restrictions should be avoided for two reasons. First, there is a pure
efficiency argument since ceilings create substantial market distortions and increase the
overal cost of achieving the EU GHG emission reduction target of minus 8% by 2008-2012.
Secondly, we see a distributional argument. Our simulations suggest that even moderate
export ceilings would generate important redistributions of trade gains benefiting relatively
rich EU members like France, the UK and Germany to the expense of for instance Portugal.
In our opinion, this redistribution is not transparant. Equity considerations concerning the
EU GHG emission abatement burden sharing should be taken into account while negotiating
the individual member’s commitment instead of being misused to advocate the imposition of
trade restrictions.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model and contains the theoretical
statement of the claim that import/export ceilings can be interpreted as means to exercise
market power. Section 3 presents some reference simulations of the EU burden sharing
agreement without trade and the free trade emission market equilibrium. Section 4 presents
the different EU proposals on supplementarity and computes the constrained market
equilibria if these proposals were to be implemented in the EU market. Section 5 tries to
identify likely ceiling rates under the assumption that the trading restriction is adopted
uniformly in all EU member states. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. A model of EU-wide carbon emission trading
Notation and basic definitions
Let EU denote the set of member states in the European Union. The cardinality of EU is
denoted by m. Per capita GDP in the year 2010 in country i is defined as:  iii xXn =  with
i X  total GDP level and  i n  population of country i in 2010. Let  i Y  denote the projected
Business-As-Usual GDP level and  i E  projected BAU carbon emissions for the year 2010.
Total GDP in the Kyoto compliance period is given by:  () iiii XYCR =-  where  () ii CR6
denotes the emission abatement cost (AC) for country i for reducing its emissions with  i R
tons compared to projected BAU emissions. Actual emissions in 2010 are defined as BAU
emissions minus abatement:  iii EER =- . The emission abatement cost function denotes the
GDP loss incurred by country i if it has to curb its carbon emissions with  i R  tons in 2010.
These losses include, among others, investment costs for fuel switching (e.g. coal or oil to
natural gas) in energy production, the cost for designing and producing more efficient cars,
insulation costs to increase fuel efficiency in private houses etc. The cost function is
assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing ( 0 i C ¢ >  for  0 i R > ) and
strictly convex in abatement ( 0 i C ¢¢ > ). Hence marginal abatement costs are rising as more
emissions are abated. Furthermore, it is assumed that the first unit of abatement is free






Assuming a European carbon emission market where permits can be bought at a fixed and
uniform price  p  and where all EU member states have been assigned an initial permit
quotum of 
Q
i E , we can write a country’s GDP as follows:
( ) ( )
TTQTTQT
iiiiiiiiiiii XYCRpEEYCRpEERiEU ØøØø =-+-=-+-+"˛ ºßºß (1)
Every country can choose between reducing its emissions more than required by the quotum
Q
i E and selling the surplus in the permit market at unit price  p , or reducing its emission less
than required and buying additional permits in the international market.
Free trade emission market equilibrium
Assuming price taking behaviour and without constraints on the trading volumes
4, a free
trade market equilibrium for permit trading is defined as a vector of emission reduction
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4 Of course, some natural limits apply to the amount of emission reduction feasible. Emission abatement
(relative to some Business-as-Usual scenario) is restricted to be nonnegative and cannot exceed the BAU
emissions: 0ii RE ££ .7
The first-order necessary and sufficient condition for this maximisation problem says that
every country will reduce its carbon emissions up to the point its marginal abatement cost is
exactly equal to the market price
5:
( ) ii CRpiEU ¢ ="˛ (3)
These first-order conditions define well-behaved, continuous and increasing emission
reduction supply curves: 
1 ()() ii RSpCp
- ¢ =  since  i C ¢  is strictly monotone, continuous and
strictly convex in abatement. Total market supply is defined as the sum of all individual
supply curves:  ()() i iEU RSpRSp
˛ ” ￿ . The market clearing price is defined as the price
level 
* p  for which total market supply is sufficient to achieve the EU Kyoto obligation:
* ()
KYOTO
EU RSpR = . The free trade market equilibrium will be denoted by an asterisks “*”.
Totally differentiating this market clearing condition shows that the equilibrium price is




















Hence, the steeper the marginal emission abatement cost functions, the stronger the price
effect of a change in the overall EU abatement objective 
KYOTO
EU R . Whether countries are net
seller or buyers of permits at the free trade market equilibrium depends on their initial
allocation of permits 
Q
i E  and on the equilibrium market price 
* p . They are net permit




- ¢ <>=-=- . The lower their assigned
amount of permits (
Q
i E ), the higher their BAU projected emissions ( i E ) and the lower the
equilibrium market price (
* p ), the more likely a country is a net permit importer.
Returning to the first-order conditions in (3), it follows directly that free emission trading
leads to a cost efficient solution since all countries’ marginal abatement costs are equalised.
However, if import and/or export caps (i.e. quantitative restrictions on the traded amount of
permits) apply, or if the assumption that all countries are price takers is not fulfilled,
equalisation of marginal costs will not always be achieved.
                                               
5 Because of the assumptions on the limit behaviour of the marginal abatement cost functions we need not
consider corner solutions.8
Constrained emission market equilibrium
Some countries advocate that free trade is unjust because some countries might consider
buying all of their emission abatement obligation abroad without domestic measures to curb
emissions. Some other countries feel that some major permit exporters would obtain too
large a share in total emission trading gains. Therefore, the use of quantified ceiling on
permit imports and/or exports is currently a hot topic in international climate negotiations.
Some EU member states extrapolate this reasoning to the EU level. Assume that the import
and export caps are given by the constraints 0iiii RRRE ££££  on individual reduction
efforts
6. How does a competitive emission market look like in this case? Like before, every
individual country is assumed to be a price taker on the emission permit market and to
maximise its GDP with respect to its emission reduction effort. However, it should take into
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A constrained market equilibrium (denoted by a superscript “c”) is characterised by the
following system of first-order conditions:
()
ccc
iii CRpiEU m ¢ =+"˛ (6)
and by the condition that the market price 
c p  clears the permit market. The Lagrange
multiplier 
c
i m  captures the effect of the import/export cap. If  0
c
i m > , this implies that
()
cc
ii CRp ¢ >. Hence, buying permits instead of reducing domestically constitutes a cost
saving. Country i  would like to import more emissions at the prevailing price level but is
prevented from doing so by a binding import cap. If, on the other hand,  0
c
i m < , the country
would like to export more permits than allowed for by its export ceiling since  ()
cc
ii CRp ¢<.
Producing additional emission abatement and selling it at the prevailing market price is a
profitable operation. When neither the import nor the export cap are binding,  0
c
i m =  and
conditions (6) boil down to the free trade market equilibrium characterised by conditions (3)
.
                                               
6 Different proposals circulate for emission import/export caps. All of these caps can always be expressed as
constraints on the reduction effort variable  i R . In particular, a ceiling that requires that the net permit
import (export) of a country, in percentage of its emission reduction commitment, should not exceed some
given percentage translates into a lower (upper) bound on emission reduction effort  i R  ( i R ).9
Emission market equilibrium with market power
Not only ceilings can prevent full cost efficiency from being attained by allowing for permit
trading, also market power can give rise to distortions. If some big countries can manipulate
the equilibrium price of permits by altering their supply or demand, additional discrepancies
between marginal abatement costs can arise. An emission market equilibrium with market
power is defined as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in which every country (or coalition
of countries if cartels would form) maximises its GDP taking as given the emission
abatement strategies of the other players in the game.
We will assume that the set of players EU  can be partitioned into sm £  disjoint and
nonempty cartels such that :  12 s EUKKK =¨¨¨ K . An emission market equilibrium
with market power is characterised by the following system of first-order conditions
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Comparing (7) to the competitive market conditions (3), we see that cost efficiency is no
longer guaranteed. In every cartel  l K  the cartel members equate their marginal emission
abatement cost to the market price plus a mark up. This mark up consists of the
multiplication of two factors: the effect of small change in reduction on the equilibrium
market price times the cartels net supply of emission permits. The first factor, the total price
effect of a change in emission abatement by country i on the equilibrium price, was shown
by Ellerman and Wing (2000) (appendix) to be negative and is the same for all countries and
cartels:  0 ij dpdRdpdR
oooo =£ . The second factor, the net supply of permits is specific to
the cartel. This implies that within every cartel, marginal abatement costs will be equated,
but across cartels, differences in marginal costs may exist.
When no country has market power, i.e.  0 i dpdR
oo = , conditions (7) simply reduces to (3),
the market power equilibrium boils down to the free trade emission market equilibrium.
However, if countries can influence the market price, i.e.  0 i dpdR
oo „ , the market power






˛ -+< ￿ , we obtain that  () ii CRp
oo ¢ > if  0 i dpdR
oo < . Hence the members of
this cartel reduce emissions more than in the free trade benchmark case without market
power. Another way of interpreting this result is by saying that permit importers favour an10
import ceiling. By restricting their demand (hence, by reducing emission more domestically),
permit importers can drive down the equilibrium market price.





˛ -+> ￿ ,
we obtain that  () ii CRp
oo ¢ < if  0 i dpdR
oo < . Basically, this means that permit exporters are
in favour of an export ceilings because by reducing their supply of permits (hence, by
abating less domestically) they can drive up the market price of permits.
The link between ceilings and market power
We notice an interesting link between the market power case and the trading ceilings.
Indeed, comparing expressions (7) and (6) we can interpret ceilings as a particular
expression of market power. One can always define emissions-trading ceilings such that the
constrained market equilibrium coincides with the market power equilibrium. In other
words, we can interpret the ceilings as just of way of enforcing market power! This
interpretation will drive our simulations of the EU permit market. Using a public choice
approach, we will try to discover behind the different ceilings proposals, which countries or
cartels are gaining from it. We will compute constrained market equilibria for different
ceiling proposals and we will compare them to market power scenarios.
A simple measure of bargaining power
Since we want to analyse the political economy of ceilings in the EU permit market we will
employ a public choice type of approach by visualising the bargaining positions of the
different EU member states in the debate. Taking different proposals (see later) for ceilings
on permit imports and/or exports, we can compute the corresponding constrained emission
market equilibrium. For evaluating the bargaining positions of the EU member states we
propose a simple measure of bargaining power. The bargaining weights are defined by the
following system of equations:















and the requirement that all weights are positive  0 i l ‡ . The last equation is a normalisation
of the weights. Since this system of equations is linear in the weights  i l  there exists a
unique solution to this problem if the coefficient matrix is of full rank. According to (8), the11
smaller the emission reduction assignment 
C
i R  of a country, the higher its bargaining weight
i l  because marginal abatement costs are inversely proportional to the bargaining weights.
Basically, this definition of bargaining weights follows from minimising a weighted sum of
emission reduction costs of the EU member states under the constraint that total abatement



















Hence, we try to find the bargaining weights that make a particular distribution of emission
abatement effort the solution of a weighted cost minimisation exercise. Therefore, the
bargaining weights can be interpreted as reflecting the relative power of the countries in the
negotiations leading to the allocation of emission abatement effort distribution. This
approach is similar to the inverse optimum approach used in Eyckmans and Cornillie (2000)
except for the fact that in this paper we use utility functions that are linear in income.
3. Simulations of free carbon emission trading in the EU
Constructing MAC curves
The quantitative analysis of the emission market in the next sections are based on
simulations using marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves and emissions data for 14
European Union member states (Luxembourg is excluded). In Eyckmans and
Cornillie (2000) we have estimated MAC curves on the basis of calculations carried out by
Capros and Mantzos (1999). The figures were drawn from simulations with the PRIMES
energy model, i.e. a partial equilibrium model of energy demand and supply. This model is
based on a least cost methodology. It computes the least cost energy supply technology mix
for meeting demand for energy services. We estimated MAC curves of an exponential




b a ¢ == (10)
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table A.1. in Appendix. A plot of the MAC
curves can be found in Eyckmans and Cornillie (2000).
The EU Burden Sharing agreement12
In 1999, an agreement was reached among the EU member states to redistribute the overall
EU commitment of 8% greenhouse gas emission reduction under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
see EC (1999a), COM(1999)230. This redistribution was made taking into account both
arguments of cost efficiency (assigning larger effort to low abatement cost countries) and
equity (less stringent abatement requirements for poorer EU members). Table 1 summarises
the most important features of the EU Burden Sharing agreement (BSA in the sequel)
without emission trading
7. We postpone the discussion on emission trading until the next
section.
TABLE 1: EU Burden Sharing agreement without emission trading
R E/E
1990 E/E
2010 AC AC/GDP AC/POP MAC
AU 6.95 -13.00 -12.68 418.31 0.22 50.40 127.51
BE 27.06 -7.50 -21.82 3696.69 1.63 352.07 303.33
DK 13.27 -21.00 -24.17 1387.31 0.88 252.24 214.50
FI 22.30 0.00 -30.30 2143.46 1.37 404.43 203.23
FR 37.30 0.00 -9.57 1837.96 0.13 29.93 106.75
GE 75.74 -21.00 -9.15 2568.93 0.13 30.95 77.78
GR 20.78 25.00 -18.99 1826.31 1.56 164.53 214.72
IR 8.79 13.00 -20.53 915.51 0.92 240.92 219.30
IT 67.12 -6.50 -15.61 6431.14 0.52 111.65 197.62
NL 61.78 -6.00 -30.05 11042.31 3.02 661.22 456.19
PO 16.84 27.00 -25.33 2259.99 2.33 219.42 276.20
SP 41.92 15.00 -15.29 3385.25 0.53 83.79 162.83
SV 11.48 4.00 -17.94 784.00 0.31 85.22 145.02
UK 76.26 -12.50 -13.33 3908.27 0.33 65.03 119.70
EU 487.58 -8.69 -14.82 42605.44 0.52 111.18 154.65
mtCO2 % % m€ % €/head €/ton CO2
The first column (R) reports absolute emission reduction in million tons of CO2 measured as
the difference in emissions between the BAU scenario and actual emission in 2010. The
second and third column contain relative emission reduction as a percentage compared to
the 1990 base year (E/E
1990) or to the 2010 BAU scenario (E/E
2010). In particular, column
E/E
1990 contains the reduction efforts agreed upon in the EU Burden Sharing Agreement.
Columns four to six report on total abatement costs in absolute terms (AC), as a percentage
of GDP (AC/GDP) or per capita (AC/POP). The last column contains the marginal
abatement cost estimate.
                                               
7 All simulations were performed using GAMS software (General Algebraic Modelling System,
http://www.gams.com). All programs and data are available from the authors upon simple request.13
Overall, the Burden Sharing Agreement would cost the EU economy slightly more than half
a percent of its projected GDP in 2010. The EU average per capita cost would amount to
111.18 €/head. However, this relatively low figure hides important regional differences
which range from about 30 €/head in Germany and France to as much as 661 €/head in the
Netherlands.
The EU average marginal abatement cost amounts to about 154.65 €/ton CO2 (equivalent
to about 567 €/ton C or approximately 500 US$/ton C
8). This MAC estimate for the EU
Burden Sharing agreement is relatively high compared to other studies, e.g. Ellerman and
Decaux (1998) or Criqui, Mima and Viguier (1999). The reason is that the total EU
reduction requirement is estimated to be about 487 mtCO2, which is almost double the
requirement used in the other two studies. Again, the EU average MAC estimate hides
substantial regional difference. Marginal abatement costs for implementing the EU Burden
Sharing Agreement are relatively low in Germany and France (77.78 and 106.75 €/ton CO2
respectively) and are as high as 456.19 €/ton CO2 in the Netherlands. These large
discrepancies in MACs indicate that the EU Burden Sharing Agreements remains far from
achieving a cost efficient implementation of the EU Kyoto reduction objective. Hence, there
exist large opportunities for permit trading within the EU.
Simulations of the EU free trade emission market
Since there are strong differences in MACs in the EU BSA, there exists a strong argument
for allowing emission trading among the EU partners. Recently, the EU Commission’s
Green Paper on emission trading (COM(2000)87) supports this view. Table 2 summarises
the intra-EU free trade emission market equilibrium.
                                               
8 One ton of carbon (C) is equivalent to 44/12=3.667 ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) in molecular weight As
exchange rate we used 1€=0.88$.14
TABLE 2: Free trade EU emission market equilibrium
E/E1990 MAC EXP AC/GDP IC/GDP TC/GDP
AU -15.22 152.86 17.60 0.31 -0.10 0.21
BE 3.59 152.86 -42.97 0.47 0.78 1.25
DK -14.06 152.86 -27.55 0.45 0.35 0.81
FI 9.81 152.86 -22.56 0.79 0.49 1.28
FR -3.82 152.86 36.05 0.25 -0.15 0.11
GE -26.46 152.86 68.62 0.42 -0.40 0.03
GR 31.15 152.86 -20.99 0.88 0.57 1.44
IR 21.14 152.86 -27.87 0.46 0.38 0.84
IT -2.79 152.86 -21.47 0.32 0.18 0.49
NL 14.42 152.86 -50.56 0.49 1.29 1.79
PO 45.45 152.86 -42.82 0.73 1.13 1.86
SP 16.25 152.86 -6.03 0.46 0.06 0.52
SV 2.91 152.86 4.80 0.34 -0.03 0.31
UK -15.20 152.86 20.09 0.51 -0.20 0.31
EU -8.69 152.86 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=152.86 €/ton CO2)
As can be seen from the second column (MAC), unrestricted emission trading leads to cost
efficiency since marginal abatement costs are equalised across all EU member states and
amount to 152.86 €/ton CO2. The high marginal abatement cost countries in the Burden
Sharing agreement without trade (Table 1) import emission abatement from the low
marginal abatement cost states. Imports (exports) of permits correspond to negative
(positive) entries in the third column (EXP). These import/export amounts are relative to
the total emission reduction required by the BSA (
2010 Q
ii EE -). Hence, Austria exports
permits for about 17.6% of its assigned emission reduction in the Bubble agreement. The
Netherlands, Portugal and Belgium are relying heavily on imports of carbon emission
permits. For the Netherlands, these imports exceed 50% of its BSA assignment. The main
exporter of permits is Germany. It exports for about 68% of its BSA emissions.
Column four (AC/GDP), five (IC/GDP) and six (TC/GDP=AC/GDP + IC/GDP) contain the
abatement cost, permit import cost and net costs  as a percent of GDP. Compared to the
BSA without trading (Table 1), total EU abatement costs fall from 0.52% to 0.41% of 2010
GDP. Allowing for emission trading represents a cost saving of about 9.11 billion €
annually. Individually, all EU member countries are better off with than without trading
(comparing last column of Table 2 and column AC/GDP in Table 1) but some gain more
than others. E.g., the Netherlands can lower their total costs from 3.02% to 1.79% of GDP,15
Portugal from 2.33% to 1.86% of GDP. Notice that Germany faces almost no costs since it
can sell a big amount of permits to other EU members.
4. Simulations of constrained emission market equilibria
Different proposals for caps on emission trading
In the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol in the different Conferences of the Parties (CoP)
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the issue of
“supplementarity” is a hot topic. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol contains a reference to
supplementarity in the sense that emission trading should be supplemental to domestic
actions. Subsequently, the EU has proposed a quantitative ceiling on emission trading (see:
http://www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/1999/sb/08.pdf). These ceilings have been at the heart
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These trading ceiling should be interpreted as annual limits on the amount of carbon
emission permits imported or exported. In Table 3 we calculated the different proposals for
the EU market. The ceilings are all reported as a percentage of BSA committed abatement:
2010 ˆ Q
iii EEE Øø - ºß . The shaded rows in Table 3 correspond to countries that are net permit
exporters under the free trade regime. The first import ceiling proposal IC1 takes 5% of the
average emission levels of 1990 and the EU Burden Sharing commitment. IC1 is more
stringent for countries that agreed to an ambitious emission reduction target (a low 
Q
i E ) in
the EU Burden Sharing agreement and that are characterised by relatively low 1990
emission levels. Comparing the permit exports (EXP) in the free trade equilibrium in
Table 2 we see that proposal IC1 is very restrictive. All importing countries except Italy and
Spain would face a binding cap. The Netherlands would import about 50% of their BSA
commitment but are restricted to only 12% in the IC1 proposal.16
TABLE 3: emission trading ceilings (% of BSA commitment)
IC1 IC2 IC3 EC1 HC
AU 37.00 65.83 65.83 37.00 50.00
BE 18.64 42.61 42.61 18.64 50.00
DK 17.78 69.22 69.22 17.78 50.00
FI 11.50 37.00 37.00 11.50 50.00
FR 47.24 43.97 47.24 47.24 50.00
GE 56.23 76.54 76.54 56.23 50.00
GR 19.20 30.51 30.51 19.20 50.00
IR 18.24 42.60 42.60 18.24 50.00
IT 27.96 52.61 52.61 27.96 50.00
NL 12.01 36.57 36.57 12.01 50.00
PO 13.17 28.03 28.03 13.17 50.00
SP 25.89 43.44 43.44 25.89 50.00
SV 22.44 42.16 42.16 22.44 50.00
UK 34.85 40.23 40.23 34.85 50.00
IC2 allows for more choice. Basically, a country can import permits up to half of the
difference between its maximum emission level in the period from 1994 until 2002 and its
commitment under the EU BSA
9. Comparing to the free trade situation, proposal  IC2
would imply substantial import constraints for the Netherlands and Portugal only.
IC3 takes the maximum of the previous two proposals IC1 and IC2. For all countries,
except for France, this amounts to the IC2 cap.
EC1 defines an export ceiling according to the same formula as IC1. Only Germany would
be constrained by this proposal. It would like to export up to 68.62% of its commitment
under free trade but is restricted by EC1 to 56.23%.
The next proposal, IC3+EC1, denotes the combination of the import ceiling IC3 with the
export ceiling EC1. It is not shown in Table 3 but it consequences can easily be deduced
from IC3 and EC1.
Finally, the so-called “However Clause” (HC) defines a combined import and export ceiling
amounting to 50% of the emission abatement commitment. Again, this proposal would only
affect Germany as an exporter. No permit exporter imports more than half of its
commitment under free trade.
For each of these different ceiling proposals, we report in appendix the details of the
constrained market equilibria that they define. Table 4 summarises the marginal abatement
                                               
9 Since Europe Energy Outlook (1999) does not provide detailed estimates for all the relevant years we had
to complete the series by ordinary extrapolation using average annual growth rates.17
costs for the different proposals and compares them to the free trade (FT) case and the EU
Burden Sharing allocation without trade (BSA). Shaded cells refer to constrained market
participants.
TABLE 4: Marginal emission abatement costs
BSA FT IC1 IC2 IC3 EC1 IC3+
EC1
HC
AU 128 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
BE 303 153 236 154 154 158 154 160
DK 215 153 175 148 148 158 152 160
FI 203 153 177 148 148 158 152 160
FR 107 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
GE 78 153 133 148 148 138 138 131
GR 215 153 158 148 148 158 152 160
IR 219 153 176 148 148 158 152 160
IT 198 153 139 148 148 158 152 160
NL 456 153 374 225 225 158 225 160
PO 276 153 238 195 195 158 195 160
SP 163 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
SV 145 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
UK 120 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
EU 155 153 155 154 154 153 154 153
p - 153 133 148 148 158 152 160
Notice first that the Burden Sharing Agreement without permit trade is mainly beneficial (in
terms of MAC) for Germany, France and the UK. On the other hand, it is to the expense of
the Netherlands and Belgium. Purely based on cost efficiency arguments, the figures suggest
that Belgium and the Netherlands should have been allowed to emit more greenhouse gases
whereas Germany, France and the UK should have been allocated a higher emission
reduction target. Invoking some distributional concern calls for even higher reduction
obligations for the richer countries (in particular Germany and the Scandinavian countries)
and a laxer treatment of the southern member states Portugal and Greece, see Eyckmans
and Cornillie (2000). These conclusions are in line with the findings of Böhringer et
al. (1998).
It is interesting to compare the different proposals in terms of the market clearing
equilibrium price. Recall that under the free trade regime, the EU permit price amounts to
approximately 153 €/ton CO2. The import cap proposals are driving the market price down
(to 133 €/ton CO2 in case of IC1) whereas export ceilings are driving prices up. The
intuition for this is clear. Import ceiling suppress demand and makes emission permits less18
scarce. As a result, the equilibrium market price must fall. Hence, import ceilings can be
interpreted as a way of enforcing monopsony power on behalf of the permit importers.
Conversely, export ceiling limit the supply of permits making them more scarce and driving
up the market price. Export ceilings can be interpreted as monopoly power exercised by the
permit exporters. A formal proof of the ceiling mechanism can be found in Ellerman and
Wing (2000).
When both import and export ceilings are used simultaneously, the effect of the equilibrium
price depends on the balance of the monopoly and monopsony power. Our simulations
suggest that in the However Clause Germany’s monopoly power would be dominant. It can
drive up the equilibrium market price by about 7 €/ton CO2 i.e. approximately a 5% price
increase. In the combined proposal IC3+EC1, the monopsony power of the permit
importers completely offsets the monopoly power of Germany and the equilibrium price is
almost equal to the price in the free trade regime.
Pay offs (in € per capita) are reported in Table 5.
TABLE 5: Pay offs (€ per capita)
BSA FT IC1 IC2 IC3 EC1 IC3+
EC1
HC
AU 50.40 48.53 50.33 49.16 49.16 47.76 48.68 47.32
BE 352.07 270.45 286.37 265.22 265.22 275.64 269.27 278.19
DK 252.24 231.81 225.66 228.52 228.52 234.86 231.09 236.30
FI 404.43 380.64 376.49 375.89 375.89 384.95 379.60 386.95
FR 29.93 24.84 28.33 25.83 25.83 23.75 25.08 23.15
GE 30.95 6.85 17.95 9.75 9.75 5.22 8.22 5.42
GR 164.53 152.59 145.38 150.64 150.64 154.39 152.16 155.24
IR 240.92 219.64 213.59 216.45 216.45 222.60 218.93 224.01
IT 111.65 106.07 99.95 104.81 104.81 107.19 105.79 107.72
NL 661.22 395.44 535.88 407.25 407.25 404.27 412.24 408.66
PO 219.42 176.47 192.61 179.36 179.36 179.74 181.05 181.34
SP 83.79 83.48 80.92 83.11 83.11 83.71 83.41 83.77
SV 85.22 84.98 84.62 85.18 85.18 84.61 85.04 84.36
UK 65.03 60.76 64.38 61.89 61.89 59.46 61.03 58.74
EU 111.18 87.41 96.35 88.41 88.41 87.64 88.52 87.94
For the EU as a whole, the restrictive IC1 proposal is the most expensive. Cost savings
from emission trading are reduced by almost 30% which is equivalent to about 3.43 billion €
annually. The other proposals are much less costly for the EU as a whole.19
For individual countries, all depends on the fact whether they are net importers or exporters
of emissions in the free trading equilibrium. Exporting countries prefer either the However
Clause HC or the export ceiling regime EC1. On the other hand, most importers prefer the
IC1 or IC2 proposal. The Netherlands and Portugal would prefer no restrictions on permit
imports at all since they rely heavily on foreign abatement to cover their emission reduction
commitments. Generally speaking, the different ceilings proposals imply important
redistributions of the cost savings from emission trading. E.g. for the Netherlands, the
difference between free trading and the IC1 proposal amounts to more than 140 € per
capita.
Bargaining power implicit in the ceiling proposals
Table 6 translates the MAC cost estimates into bargaining weights.
TABLE 6: Bargaining weights
BSA FT IC1 IC2 IC3 EC1 IC3+
EC1
HC
AU 9.29 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
BE 3.91 7.14 4.88 7.19 7.19 7.07 7.28 7.03
DK 5.52 7.14 6.59 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
FI 5.83 7.14 6.48 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
FR 11.10 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
GE 15.23 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 8.05 8.10 8.57
GR 5.52 7.14 7.28 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
IR 5.40 7.14 6.55 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
IT 5.99 7.14 8.25 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
NL 2.60 7.14 3.07 4.92 4.92 7.07 4.98 7.03
PO 4.29 7.14 4.84 5.68 5.68 7.07 5.75 7.03
SP 7.27 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
SV 8.17 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
UK 9.90 7.14 8.68 7.47 7.47 7.07 7.39 7.03
In the free trade regime, marginal abatement costs, and hence also the bargaining weights,
are equalised across all EU member states. This case will serve as benchmark in the sequel.
The IC1 proposal clearly favours permit exporters to the expense of the importing
countries. Especially the countries that rely heavily on permit imports (the Netherlands,
Belgium and Portugal) are hurt by IC1. The bargaining weight of the Netherlands is only
35% of the weight of an exporting country like Germany.
Proposals IC2 an IC3 are less restrictive and imply low bargaining weights mainly for the
Netherlands and Portugal. The export ceiling proposal EC1 and the However Clause HC20
give a substantial advantage to Germany, up to about 22% in the HC case. Under the
combined proposal IC3+EC1, the bargaining weights of exporters and importers are
converging compared to the However Clause.
Our general appreciation of the different proposals is the following. Clearly, the different
proposals should be interpreted as a way of achieving a balance of power or a distribution
of emission trading gains between the extremes of the Burden Sharing Agreement without
trade BSA and the free trading regime FT. IC1 entails a more equal distribution of
bargaining power than BSA but still remains very restrictive for the Netherlands and
Portugal. Moreover, it would give permit importers a strong instrument to exploit their
monopsony power vis-à-vis the exporters. In our opinion, the EU heavy weights Germany,
France and UK will never accept a proposal that is so strongly against their interest. On the
other end of the spectrum we find that the However Clause gives important monopoly rents
to Germany only. The importers group will resist this type of regulation of trade and, more
importantly, the cohesion between the exporters will become under strong pressure. In our
opinion, the However Clause is too extreme at the other side of the spectrum. Most likely,
some intermediate proposal combining import and export restrictions (IC3+EC1 for
instance) has the highest chance of serving as a compromise proposal.
5. Simulations of uniform ceilings
How do these different proposals relate to “individually optimal” ceilings on permit trade. In
order to answer this question, we will focus on uniform import/export caps only, i.e. a
ceiling (expressed as a percentage of committed emission reduction) that is the same for all
EU member states. In this section we will calculate constrained emission trading equilibria
for ever more stringent ceilings and we will plot the pay off of the different market players.
This will enable us to (i) visualise who wins and loses from imposing the ceilings, (ii) show
the most preferred uniform ceiling percentage for every country and (iii) judge the relative
gain compared to the free trade reference situation for every EU member state. This
information on most preferred ceiling levels (“peaks”) will enable us to make some
predictions on likely outcomes of negotiations processes taking into account different
decision rules like ordinary or qualified majority rule.21
Identifying a uniform import cap
The picture of winners and losers of imposing a uniform import cap is rather complicated.
In Table A9 we show the net cost per capita (TC/POP) for different values of import caps.
We manipulated the per capita cost figures in Table A9 and plotted them in the following
Figure 1. For different values of import caps, Figure 1 shows the ratio of costs in the
constrained equilibrium over the free permit trade situation. This way of representing ceiling
allocations is also used by Ellerman and Wing (2000) and Criqui et al. (1999). The figure
should be read from right to left. An import cap of 55% (meaning that 45% of abatement
should be domestic) or higher has no effect since none of the EU members imports that
much of its reduction obligation. In this case, the cost figures in Table A9 correspond to the
free trade cost in Table 2 and the cost ratio in Figure 1 equals one. However, below 50%,
the uniform import cap becomes binding for the Netherlands first and the market price starts
falling (plotted against the right axis in Figure 1) since total demand for permits is lower. In
the extreme case of a zero percent import cap, implying that all reduction should occur
domestically and trade is prohibited, we are back to the EU Burden Sharing Agreement
without trade (Table 1).


















































































































Notice that the cost increase of imposing import caps is born mainly by the permit exporting
countries (dotted lines) Austria, France, Germany and the UK. Indeed, imposing an import
cap lowers demand and hence depresses the EU permit price. This causes export revenues
losses for permit exporters. On the other hand, the cap makes it possible for many importers
to exploit their monopsony market power. For many of the permit importers, the reduction
in the expenses for buying permits outweighs (initially) the increase in abatement costs for
these constrained permit importers. However, for severe import caps, also the importers
start loosing and their costs converge to the EU Burden Sharing Agreement figures in
Table 1. Ellerman and Wing (2000) explain in detail the effects of import caps on
constrained and unconstrained permit importers.
This monopsony effect can be observed for most of the permit importing countries.
However, the extent to which importers can exploit their monopsony power is very
different. The Netherlands are benefiting only very little from a 50% import cap (this
becomes more clear looking at the cost data in Table A9 than in Figure 1). For more
stringent ceilings, they start loosing. Belgium and Portugal would gain somewhat more than
1% compared to the free trade scenario by imposing a EU wide import cap of 40%. Finally,
for the EU as a whole, the costs are uniformly increasing in the cap percentage. Any
restriction of permit trade prevents some cost savings from being realised. Overall, we see
that the importers can indeed exploit some monopsony power but the gains compared to the
free trade regime are rather moderate.
What can we say about the most likely outcome of the uniform import cap game among the
EU member states? The shaded cells in Table A9 indicate the most preferred choice for the
different permit importers of a uniform import cap. They correspond to the “peaks” in
Figure 1. In particular, the Netherlands prefer an import cap of 50%, Belgium and Portugal
of 40%, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland and Italy of 20%, and Spain and Sweden of
10%. The exporters would prefer no cap at all. Given this configuration, we can compute
the median value
10 of most preferred caps, which lies between 20 and 40%. However, it is
quite unlikely that such an important matter would be settled among EU members by
                                               
10 Since we have an even number of players (14), the median outcome is in fact an interval of import ceiling
between the peaks of the 7
th and 8
th player. We should mention also that strictly speaking, preferences over
import ceilings are not single peaked. For stringent ceiling rates (5%), some countries experience a
secondary rise in the cost ratio. This implies that we should be carefull when applying public choice results
(median voter theorem etc) in this context. We will mostly neglect the extreme stringent ceiling results in
the sequel since they are not realistic.23
ordinary majority voting. Given that most important EU member states like Germany,
France and the UK are in favour of no import restriction at all, we believe that the most
likely outcome is a nonbinding import cap somewhere in between 100% and 55%. Hence,
the requirement would be that countries perform zero to 45% of their emission reduction
commitment domestically.
Identifying a uniform export cap
We can repeat the same analysis for the case of a uniform export cap. Germany, France,
UK, Austria, Sweden and Spain would gain from imposing a moderate ceiling on permit
exports whereas all other countries (and the EU as a whole) would loose. In particular
Germany could gain more than 20% (compared to the free trade situation) when a EU wide
export cap of approximately 55% of its committed emission reduction effort is adopted. The
EU wide permit price would rise only slightly to 158 €/ton CO2. The other gainers preferred
export caps are much more stringent: up to 25% for France, 20% for the UK and Austria,
and even 5% for Spain.
The countries hurt most by the export caps are the main permit importers: the Netherlands,
Belgium and Portugal. This is straightforward, since they have to pay higher prices for
emission permits.










































































































Figure 2 suggest that Germany has an important incentive to strive for the imposition of a
uniform export cap of about 55%. This figure is remarkably close to the ceiling proposals
EC1 (56%) and the However Clause (50%) we discussed in Table 3.
Using ordinary majority vote, we see that the median outcome is situated right of
Germany’s 55% peak. In that outcome six players want a strictly positive export cap and
eight prefer no export cap at all. This is rather inaccurate as prediction as any ceiling rate
between zero and 55% is consistent with our data. However, using a qualified majority rule,
it is clear that the EU heavy weights will be able to have a bigger weight in the decision
making. Therefore, we believe that an export ceiling of approximately 50% is the most
likely outcome of a voting game between EU member states on uniform export ceilings.
Identifying a uniform import-export cap
In this section we investigate a combined import-export cap of the same magnitude in all
EU countries. The pattern in Figure 3 resembles closely the previous Figure 2. For a
relatively high combined import-export ceiling rate (between 100% and 50%), only the
export part is binding since none of the importers buys more than half of its committed
abatement effort abroad. The combined ceiling is therefore identical to a uniform export
ceiling and we now from the previous section that Germany would be able to exercise
substantial monopoly power in that case. The import restriction only comes into effect for
relatively low ceiling rates. Recall that the Netherlands, the largest importer in relative25
terms, is importing for about 50% of its committed emission abatement in the free trade
scenario. The import ceiling results in the monopoly power of the permit exporting
countries other than Germany, being tempered. Careful inspection of Figures 2 and 3
reveals that France, the UK, Austria, Sweden and Spain gain less under a combined ceiling
system compared to a unilateral export ceiling.














































































































































Concerning the political economy of the choice of a combined import-export ceiling, the
same conclusions as under the export ceiling apply. The median combined ceiling rate lies
somewhere between 100% and 55%. As it is more likely that some kind of qualified
majority rule will be used on these issues, we might conclude that a 50% combined ceiling is
the likely outcome of an intra EU negotiation process. This is exactly the “however clause”
proposal we investigated higher.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates ceilings on permit trading within the European Union. Using
marginal GHG emission abatement cost curves calibrated to PRIMES simulations, we first
computed constrained emission market equilibria for the different proposals put forward by26
EU negotiators in the aftermath of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. The import ceiling proposal
turns out to be beneficial for the small EU member states like Belgium and Portugal.
However, they are strongly against the interest of the permit exporters Germany, France
and the UK. Given the current balance of power within the EU, we believe that there is little
scope for stringent import ceilings in the EU market.
Export ceilings on the other hand would give strong monopoly power to France, the UK,
and most importantly, Germany. The latter might improve itself considerably even for
relatively moderate export ceilings of 50% of committed emission abatement. Combining
the findings we believe that a combination of a moderate export ceiling and an almost
nonbinding import ceiling constitutes a reasonable compromise in the balance of power
between permit importers and exporters in the EU. This finding is in line with the so-called
“however clause” proposal according to which both imports and exports of permits would
be limited to maximally 50% of a country’s committed emission abatement.
The focus of this paper is descriptive, i.e. we try to reveal the incentives of the EU member
states to strive for some emission trading restrictions. Our conclusions should not be
interpreted as an argument in favour of ceilings. On the contrary, we feel that trade
restrictions are to be avoided, because they generate important inefficiencies and obscure
redistributive transfers. Equity and fairness considerations should be taken into account
while negotiating the EU member state’s abatement commitment and should not be misused
to promote emissions trading restrictions. In this respect, we agree and fully support the
argument put forward by Ellerman and Wing (2000) and Criqui et al. (1998).
Our analysis is incomplete in several respects. Important topics for future research include,
first, a rigorous theoretical analysis of market power in emission permit markets. The
important work by Westskog (1996) and Ellerman and Wing (2000) e.g., does not deal with
the issue of cartel stability or endogenous coalition formation among permit importers or
exporters. Secondly, the numerical simulation model depends strongly upon the PRIMES
marginal abatement cost estimates reported by Capros and Mantzos (1999). Given the fact
that these estimates are relatively high compared to other estimates in the literature, a
sensitivity analysis is needed.27
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Appendix
TABLE A1: MAC function estimated coefficients
Au Be Dk Fi Fr Ge Gr Ir It Nl Po Sp Sv Uk
i a 14.58 5.42 14.16 6.39 1.57 0.29 2.7 19.87 2.26 0.76 13.91 3.66 9.35 0.37
i b 1.12 1.22 1.05 1.11 1.17 1.29 1.44 1.10 1.06 1.55 1.06 1.02 1.12 1.3428
These coefficients have been estimated using marginal abatement costs reported in Capros and Mantzos
(1999). A loglinear version of the marginal cost function (4) was estimated for each country separately by
means of OLS. All coefficients are significant on the 5% level. More details on the estimates can be found
in Cornillie (2000).








AU 55.0 54.8 123600 190400 7700 8300
BE 104.8 124.0 152600 230400 10000 10500
DK 52.7 54.9 101700 159500 5100 5500
FI 51.3 73.6 106200 159200 5000 5300
FR 352.4 389.7 941500 1411700 56700 61400
GE 951.6 827.6 1297400 2013200 79400 83000
GR 70.9 109.4 65300 119100 10200 11100
IR 30.1 42.8 35900 100300 3500 3800
IT 388.0 429.9 861200 1247200 56700 57600
NL 153.0 205.6 223400 376600 15000 16700
PO 39.1 66.5 53100 99400 9900 10300
SP 201.9 274.1 387800 6475000 38900 40400
SV 50.0 64.0 180800 2537000 8600 9200
UK 566.9 572.3 769600 1183200 57600 60100
EU 3068.2 3289.1 5300100 8191400 364300 383200
source: EC (1999b), European Union Energy outlook to 2030
(a)  million tons of CO2
(b)  million € (1990)
(c)  1000 people
(d)  € (1990) per head
TABLE A.3: EU constrained emission market equilibrium, IC1
E/E
90 MAC EXP AC/GDP IMP/GDP TC/GDP
AU -13.45 133 +3.52 0.24 -0.02 0.22
BE -2.69 236 -18.64 1.03 0.29 1.32
DK -16.53 175 -17.78 0.59 0.20 0.78
FI +5.00 177 -11.50 1.05 0.22 1.27
FR -2.16 133 +20.39 0.20 -0.07 0.12
GE -25.06 133 +51.02 0.33 -0.26 0.07
GR +30.63 158 -19.20 0.92 0.45 1.37
IR +18.33 176 -18.24 0.60 0.21 0.82
IT -1.66 139 -27.96 0.26 0.20 0.46
NL -1.15 374 -12.01 2.17 0.27 2.43
PO +32.68 238 -13.17 1.73 0.30 2.04
SP +18.81 133 -18.33 0.35 0.16 0.51
SV +5.75 133 -7.69 0.26 0.05 0.31
UK -13.57 133 +7.93 0.40 -0.07 0.33
EU -8.69 155 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.45
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=133 €/ton CO2)29
TABLE A.4: EU constrained emission market equilibrium, IC2=IC3
E/E
90 MAC EXP AC/GDP IMP/GDP TC/GDP
AU -14.81 148 +14.31 0.29 -0.08 0.22
BE +3.50 154 -42.61 0.47 0.75 1.22
DK -13.52 148 -29.70 0.43 0.37 0.79
FI +10.75 148 -24.73 0.75 0.52 1.26
FR -3.43 148 +32.40 0.24 -0.13 0.11
GE -26.14 148 +64.54 0.40 -0.36 0.04
GR +31.65 148 -22.71 0.83 0.59 1.42
IR +21.73 148 -29.91 0.44 0.39 0.83
IT -2.39 148 -23.78 0.30 0.19 0.49
NL +8.77 225 -36.57 0.93 0.90 1.83
PO +39.08 195 -28.03 1.17 0.72 1.89
SP +16.85 148 -8.92 0.44 0.09 0.52
SV +3.57 148 +1.88 0.32 -0.01 0.31
UK -14.82 148 +17.27 0.48 -0.17 0.32
EU -8.69 154 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.42
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=148 €/ton CO2)
TABLE A.5: EU constrained emission market equilibrium, EC1
E/E
90
MAC EXP AC/GDP IC/GDP TC/GDP
AU -15.64 158 +20.87 0.33 -0.12 0.21
BE +3.22 158 -41.51 0.49 0.78 1.27
DK -14.61 158 -25.40 0.48 0.34 0.82
FI +8.86 158 -20.39 0.84 0.45 1.30
FR -4.20 158 +39.68 0.27 -0.17 0.10
GE -25.48 138 +56.23 0.36 -0.33 0.02
GR +30.65 158 -19.29 0.92 0.54 1.46
IR +20.54 158 -25.84 0.49 0.36 0.85
IT -3.18 158 -19.17 0.33 0.16 0.50
NL +14.02 158 -49.57 0.52 1.30 1.82
PO +44.72 158 -41.14 0.78 1.12 1.89
SP +15.65 158 -3.15 0.49 0.03 0.53
SV +2.25 158 +7.70 0.36 -0.06 0.31
UK -15.58 158 +22.88 0.54 -0.23 0.30
EU -8.69 153 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=158 €/ton CO2)30
TABLE A.6: EU constrained emission market equilibrium, IC3+EC1
E/E
90
MAC EXP AC/GDP IC/GDP TC/GDP
AU -15.13 152 +16.85 0.31 -0.09 0.21
BE +3.50 154 -42.61 0.47 0.77 1.24
DK -13.94 152 -28.04 0.45 0.36 0.80
FI +10.02 152 -23.05 0.78 0.50 1.28
FR -3.73 152 +35.22 0.25 -0.14 0.11
GE -25.48 138 +56.23 0.36 -0.32 0.03
GR +31.26 152 -21.38 0.86 0.57 1.44
IR +21.27 152 -28.33 0.46 0.38 0.84
IT -2.70 152 -22.00 0.31 0.18 0.49
NL +8.77 225 -36.57 0.93 0.92 1.85
PO +39.08 195 -28.03 1.17 0.73 1.91
SP +16.39 152 -6.69 0.46 0.07 0.52
SV +3.06 152 +4.14 0.34 -0.03 0.31
UK -15.12 152 +19.45 0.50 -0.19 0.31
EU -8.69 154 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.42
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=152 €/ton CO2)
TABLE A.7: EU constrained emission market equilibrium, HC
E/E
90 MAC EXP AC/GDP IC/GDP TC/GDP
AU -15.85 160 +22.52 0.34 -0.13 0.21
BE +3.03 160 -40.78 0.50 0.77 1.27
DK -14.88 160 -24.32 0.49 0.33 0.82
FI +8.39 160 -19.30 0.86 0.44 1.30
FR -4.39 160 +41.50 0.28 -0.18 0.10
GE -24.98 131 +50.00 0.32 -0.30 0.02
GR +30.40 160 -18.44 0.94 0.52 1.46
IR +20.24 160 -24.81 0.50 0.35 0.85
IT -3.39 160 -18.01 0.34 0.16 0.50
NL +13.82 160 -49.08 0.53 1.30 1.82
PO +44.36 160 -40.29 0.79 1.10 1.89
SP +15.35 160 -1.69 0.51 0.02 0.53
SV +1.92 160 +9.16 0.37 -0.07 0.31
UK -15.77 160 +24.28 0.55 -0.25 0.30
EU -8.69 153 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41
% €/ton CO2 % % % %
(p=160 €/ton CO2)31
TABLE A8: Uniform Import Cap, cost (€ per capita)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
AU 50.40 49.58 50.06 50.39 50.25 49.85 49.51 49.25 48.98 48.72 48.55 48.53 48.53 48.53 48.53
BE 352.07 327.63 308.74 294.24 283.87 276.86 271.55 268.14 267.41 268.92 270.30 270.45 270.45 270.45 270.45
DK 252.24 239.65 231.40 226.43 224.51 224.98 226.26 227.95 229.55 230.89 231.72 231.81 231.81 231.81 231.81
FI 404.43 384.84 372.83 366.53 365.55 368.69 372.55 375.07 377.39 379.31 380.51 380.64 380.64 380.64 380.64
FR 29.93 29.92 29.69 29.01 28.07 27.07 26.43 25.99 25.54 25.14 24.87 24.84 24.84 24.84 24.84
GE 30.95 27.8 24.26 20.7 16.99 13.6 11.55 10.21 8.89 7.71 6.94 6.85 6.85 6.85 6.85
GR 164.53 154.93 149.07 146.09 145.77 147.57 149.28 150.31 151.25 152.05 152.54 152.59 152.59 152.59 152.59
IR 240.92 228.35 220.03 214.94 212.86 213.14 214.28 215.91 217.45 218.74 219.55 219.64 219.64 219.64 219.64
IT 111.65 106.53 103.46 101.93 101.83 102.83 103.91 104.59 105.21 105.72 106.03 106.07 106.07 106.07 106.07
NL 661.22 599.4 548.54 506.80 473.67 447.91 426.95 410.94 400.81 395.95 395.21 395.44 395.44 395.44 395.44
PO 219.42 205.97 195.74 188.01 182.62 179.1 176.41 174.71 174.48 175.50 176.37 176.47 176.47 176.47 176.47
SP 83.79 80.98 79.88 80.04 81.29 82.33 82.79 83.04 83.24 83.39 83.47 83.48 83.48 83.48 83.48
SV 85.22 82.94 82.71 83.87 84.8 85.16 85.22 85.2 85.14 85.06 84.99 84.98 84.98 84.98 84.98
UK 65.03 64.32 65 64.86 64.16 63.22 62.54 62.06 61.57 61.11 60.8 60.76 60.76 60.76 60.76
EU 111.18 104.67 99.85 96.05 93.18 91.1 89.65 88.6 87.9 87.54 87.41 87.41 87.41 87.41 87.41
p 104.47 116.85 126.31 134.56 141.23 144.96 147.3 149.54 151.48 152.72 152.86 152.86 152.86 152.8632
TABLE A9: Uniform Export Cap, cost (€ per capita)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
AU 50.40 44.33 43.43 42.29 42.37 43.03 44.57 45.57 46.34 46.95 47.32 47.67 48.01 48.31 48.53
BE 352.07 349.46 326.17 316.14 306.07 298.27 290.55 286.60 283.21 280.21 278.19 276.15 274.08 271.98 270.45
DK 252.24 245.49 252.18 251.51 248.97 246.12 242.70 240.77 239.02 237.41 236.30 235.15 233.96 232.73 231.81
FI 404.43 390.30 402.44 404.42 402.75 399.70 395.52 393.01 390.68 388.49 386.95 385.35 383.68 381.94 380.64
FR 29.93 24.89 23.56 22.04 21.37 21.10 21.44 21.57 21.98 22.66 23.15 23.63 24.09 24.53 24.84
GE 30.95 22.02 18.63 14.88 12.37 10.41 9.31 7.85 6.77 6.06 5.42 5.21 5.43 6.10 6.85
GR 164.53 159.52 164.50 164.10 162.64 160.98 158.99 157.86 156.84 155.89 155.24 154.56 153.86 153.13 152.59
IR 240.92 235.06 240.91 239.63 236.76 233.78 230.33 228.41 226.68 225.10 224.01 222.88 221.72 220.53 219.64
IT 111.65 107.39 110.52 111.58 111.48 110.86 109.88 109.26 108.67 108.11 107.72 107.30 106.86 106.41 106.07
NL 661.22 571.85 501.46 479.64 459.44 444.61 430.45 423.38 417.39 412.15 408.66 405.14 401.60 398.04 395.44
PO 219.42 219.42 209.86 204.29 198.42 193.74 189.02 186.58 184.48 182.61 181.34 180.06 178.76 177.44 176.47
SP 83.79 78.13 78.94 79.5 81.51 82.79 83.51 83.7 83.78 83.79 83.77 83.72 83.65 83.56 83.48
SV 85.22 77.3 77.15 76.69 78.13 80.38 82.38 83.16 83.71 84.12 84.36 84.56 84.74 84.89 84.98
UK 65.03 55.36 53.6 51.52 51.38 52.19 54.41 55.95 57.16 58.13 58.74 59.32 59.88 60.4 60.76
EU 111.18 100.9 96.72 94.13 92.25 90.87 89.89 89.21 88.67 88.26 87.94 87.69 87.52 87.43 87.41
p 276.07 217.87 202.85 189.82 180.71 172.35 168.28 164.89 161.96 160.03 158.1 156.17 154.25 152.8633
TABLE A10: Uniform Import-Export Cap, cost (€ per capita)
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
AU 50.40 48.82 47.04 46.17 46.10 46.75 46.91 46.96 47.02 47.19 47.32 47.67 48.01 48.31 48.53
BE 352.07 335.92 323.66 311.89 300.88 290.86 284.84 281.31 279.84 278.92 278.19 276.15 274.08 271.98 270.45
DK 252.24 247.41 245.37 242.95 240.44 237.97 237.52 237.38 237.21 236.70 236.30 235.15 233.96 232.73 231.81
FI 404.43 398.37 397.19 395.29 392.54 389.24 388.64 388.44 388.21 387.51 386.95 385.35 383.68 381.94 380.64
FR 29.93 28.14 26.18 24.85 24.07 23.79 23.29 22.92 22.78 22.98 23.15 23.63 24.09 24.53 24.84
GE 30.95 26.91 22.57 19.11 16.44 14.46 12.10 9.89 7.97 6.57 5.42 5.21 5.43 6.10 6.85
GR 164.53 160.95 159.91 158.89 157.65 156.22 155.96 155.87 155.77 155.48 155.24 154.56 153.86 153.13 152.59
IR 240.92 235.78 233.42 230.77 228.12 225.64 225.21 225.06 224.90 224.40 224.01 222.88 221.72 220.53 219.64
IT 111.65 110.28 110.21 109.82 109.14 108.30 108.15 108.10 108.04 107.86 107.72 107.30 106.86 106.41 106.07
NL 661.22 611.30 569.96 532.13 498.09 468.00 446.04 429.84 418.66 411.33 408.66 405.14 401.60 398.04 395.44
PO 219.42 211.23 205.21 199.21 193.41 187.98 184.85 183.06 182.37 181.80 181.34 180.06 178.76 177.44 176.47
SP 83.79 83.68 83.35 83.53 83.72 83.79 83.79 83.79 83.79 83.78 83.77 83.72 83.65 83.56 83.48
SV 85.22 83.99 82.53 82.48 83.28 83.99 84.10 84.13 84.17 84.28 84.36 84.56 84.74 84.89 84.98
UK 65.03 62.17 59.07 57.40 57.03 57.82 58.07 58.15 58.25 58.53 58.74 59.32 59.88 60.40 60.76
EU 111.18 106.15 101.89 98.35 95.45 93.13 91.33 89.94 88.96 88.31 87.94 87.69 87.52 87.43 87.41
P 168.79 174.76 171.95 167.57 162.95 162.16 161.90 161.61 160.72 160.03 158.10 156.17 154.25 152.86The Center for Economic Studies (CES) is the research division of
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